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Abstract. I will discuss some familiar problems in the philosophy of religion 
which arise for theistic belief. I will argue that it may be most worthwhile to 
focus on a particular sort of theistic belief, capital-T Th eism, central to which 
is a particular conception both of God and of the believer’s relation to God. 
At the heart of Th eism in this sense is the continuing experience of God, both 
individual and collective. Compared with the evidence for Th eistic belief that is 
provided by this experiential contact with God, most of the usually-considered 
arguments for and against God’s existence are secondary.
Of man’s whole terrestrial possessions and attainments, unspeakably the 
noblest are his Symbols, divine or divine-seeming; under which he marches 
and fi ghts, with victorious assurance, in this life-battle; what we can call his 
Realised Ideals. Of which Realised Ideals, omitting the rest, consider only [] 
his church. Th e church; what a word was there; richer than Golconda and 
the treasures of the world! In the heart of the remotest mountains rises the 
little Kirk; the dead all slumbering around it, under their white memorial-
stones, ‘in hope of a happy Resurrection’:—dull wert thou, O reader, if never 
in any hour (say of moaning midnight, when such Kirk hung spectral in the 
sky, and Being was as if swallowed up in darkness) it spoke to thee—things 
unspeakable, that went into thy soul’s soul. Strong was he that had a Church, 
what we can call a Church: he stood thereby, though ‘in the centre of 
Immensities, in the confl ux of Eternities,’ yet manlike towards God and man; 
the vague shoreless Universe had become for him a fi rm city, and dwelling 
which he knew. Such virtue was in Belief; in these words, well-spoken: 
I believe. Well might men prize their Credo, and raise stateliest Temples for 
it, and reverend Hierarchies, and give it the tithe of their substance; it was 
worth living and dying for.
(Th omas Carlyle, Th e French Revolution, Book 1, Chapter II)
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I.
First we should distinguish theism from mere belief in the supernatural. 
Th e latter, illustrated by ghost-stories, tales of second sight, apotropaic 
rituals and sacrifi ces to prevent the failure of a harvest or a navy, the 
consulting of the sacred geese, and the throwing of the salt always over 
one’s left  shoulder, is a human universal, and was pretty well certainly 
known in one form or another even to our Pleistocene ancestors: primus 
in orbe deos fecit timor.1 Another name for it, among those who disbelieve 
in it or are hostile, is superstition.
And the former, theism? Th e Shorter Oxford Dictionary says that theism is 
“belief in a deity or deities, as opp. to atheism”2. But—a second distinction—
the kind of theism I want to focus on here is more specifi c than this. 
Th eism in my sense, Th eism with a capital T, is belief not in deities but 
in God with a capital G. Th is is a much less universal phenomenon than 
supernaturalism/superstition. It has a historical particularity; in the case 
that unites the histories of fi rst Asia, then Europe and Africa, then the 
Americas, and fi nally Oceania, the Judaeo-Christian-Islamic tradition,3 
we can more or less see where Th eism begins. It begins with the writing of 
the fi rst chapter of Genesis, where the author makes it as clear as he knows 
how that the God of whom he speaks, Yahweh, is not just another heavenly 
being like the sun or the moon, but the sun and moon’s creator.4
1 “It was fear that fi rst made gods in the world”, Statius, Th ebaid 3.661.
2 Th ird edition, 1933, Oxford: Clarendon Press, sv. In a separate entry, the SED also 
says that theism is a “morbid condition” “caused by excessive tea-drinking”. No doubt 
Anglicanism is the secret connection here.
3 In discussing this tradition I shall talk mostly about the Christian part of it. No 
off ence lies, I hope, in speaking mainly of what I know. Perhaps there would be off ence 
in speaking ignorantly of what I do not know.
4 Of course it is likely that Th eism emerged from a world view in which there was 
“one Big God and many sub-deities, where the latter are personifi ed attributes or aspects 
of the nature of the Big God. Th e unsophisticated can take the sub-gods seriously and 
worship them; the sophisticated can still be intellectually monotheists, but allow the sub-
god cults on practical or aesthetic grounds. Hinduism seems to work like this [today]. So 
did Yahwism . . . where the ‘host of heaven’ was understood to be the gods of the Gentiles, 
also identifi ed as angels and planetary powers, who each had their allotted sphere of 
authority under Yahweh; but Israel had direct access to the Big God through the Torah.” 
(From correspondence with Jeff rey John, to whom thanks.)
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Th e diff erence between Th eism as belief in God and theism as 
belief in deities is that the latter can easily be just another variety of 
supernaturalism. Especially where the deities are small and local enough, 
there seems little diff erence in principle between believing in such 
deities and believing in fairies or ghosts: think of nature-gods like Iris 
the rainbow-goddess, or Freya/Persephone of the harvest, or Th or the 
thunder-god. Th e classical pagan gods were very frequently of this sort, 
as were the deities of pagan Norway and Britain and Mexico. In another 
common pattern, pagan deities arose by “euhemerising” apotheosis—by 
the route from being a human hero to occupying yet another alcove in 
the cluttered and haphazard pantheon of (say) the Rome of late antiquity. 
Th is was a route, indeed, that mortal Roman emperors regularly trod. 
Even Greek generals sometimes took it too.5
Th e contrast between any such view and what I am calling Th eism, as 
it showed up in the late-Roman context, is well put by the great French 
historian Paul Veyne. He notes fi rst the “gigantism” of the Christian 
Th eists’ God:
Th e originality of Christianity lies not in its so-called monotheism6 but in 
the gigantic nature of its god, the creator of both heaven and earth: it is 
a gigantism that is alien to the pagan gods and is inherited from the god of 
the Bible. Th is biblical god was so huge that, despite his anthropomorphism 
(humankind was created in his image), it was possible for him to become 
a metaphysical god: even while retaining his human, passionate and protective 
character, the gigantic scale of the Judaic god allowed him eventually to take 
on the role of the founder and creator of the cosmic order. (Veyne p.20)
Besides this “gigantism,” it was the “human, passionate, and protective 
character” of the Christians’ god that, Veyne argues, set Christian 
Th eism apart from the chaotic polytheism of the surrounding society. 
Th ere one found only an ill-defi ned assortment of quirky, sinister, 
5 In the Roman world, one thinks at once of the posthumous cult of Divus Augustus 
and of pretty well every later pagan emperor—as ironically referred to by Vespasian on 
his death-bed: “I think I am about to become a god”. Apotheosis was rarer in the classical 
Greek world, but there is the story of Alexander at the shrine of Zeus Ammon in Egypt 
“hearing” that he is Zeus’s son, or Lysander being accorded divine honours in Samos: see 
http://www.iranica.com/articles/lysander . (Th anks to Elton Barker for discussion.)
6 Veyne doubts that Christianity is strictly speaking monotheistic.
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unpredictable, highly localised, and at best conditionally benign 
daemons. But here was a universal and omnipresent God of “infi nite 
mercy,” caring unconditionally “about the fate of each and every human 
soul, including mine and yours,” with whom what was on off er was “a 
mutual and passionate relationship of love and authority” (Veyne p.23). 
As Veyne shows, there was a huge diff erence between the eff ects of the 
two religions on the working psychology of anyone actually practising 
either. And that contrast nearly always worked in Th eism’s favour.
For whoever accepted the Christian faith, life became more intense, more 
organised, and was placed under greater pressure. An individual had to 
conform to a rule that marked him or her out . . . in exchange, his or her life 
suddenly acquired an eternal signifi cance within a cosmic plan, something 
that no philosophy or paganism could confer. Paganism left  human life 
exactly as it was, an ephemeral amalgam of details. Th anks to the Christian 
god, that life received the unity of a magnetic fi eld in which every action 
and every internal response took on a meaning, either good or bad. Th is 
meaning . . . steered the believer towards an absolute and eternal entity that 
was not a mere principle but a great living being. (Veyne p.19)
Th eism is just this combination of belief in an absolute and all-powerful 
God, utterly external and out there (“transcendent”), who is yet also 
intimately known within the believer (“immanent”) as moral authority, 
direction for life, warning or encouraging adviser, saviour, answerer of 
prayers, friend—sometimes even as lover. To any more austerely classical 
pagan mind, even the Th eist’s belief that his God answered prayer is likely to 
have seemed an absurdity: Dios gar dysparaitêtoi phrenes.7 As for the fact 
that the Th eist’s relationship with God could be conceivable in romantic 
or even quasi-erotic terms, to any rationalistically-minded outsider this 
must seem one of the most astonishing, not to say outrageous, things 
about Th eism. Yet the evidence, across the whole spectrum of diff erent 
Th eist traditions, is quite unequivocal.8
7 “For prayers do not defl ect the mind of Zeus”, Aeschylus, Prometheus Vinctus 34.
8 Just for starters: Rabindranath Tagore addresses his God (who, as oft en in 
sophisticated forms of the ostensibly polytheistic religion Hinduism, is pretty clearly 
the God of Th eism) as “beloved of my heart,” Jalal ud-Din Rumi writes that “Our death 
is our wedding with eternity,” Jesus calls himself, and John the Baptist calls him, the 
bridegroom, St Teresa of Avila’s Th e Interior Castle is an entire book (one of many) on 
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It is this combination of immanence and transcendence that makes the 
Th eist view so psychologically compelling. If I adopt Th eism then even 
within little me there will lovingly dwell the God of everything—as in the 
manger at Bethlehem, or as in Mary: “For he that is mighty hath done 
great things in me, and holy is his name” (Luke 1.49). It is easy to see how 
this combination serves, to give the believer a sense of the importance 
of his life and actions: “the vague shoreless Universe” has “become for 
him a fi rm city, and dwelling which he” knows. Many scholars think 
that Christian moralists make more than the classical pagans did of the 
virtue of humility. If that is so, perhaps it is because those who dare to 
believe that their own small hearts can become the dwelling-place of the 
infi nite God have the more need of humility.9 Th roughout history the 
Th eists’ version of this idea of the divine indwelling or enthousiasmos,10 
with the cosmic importance of the quotidian as its corollary, has seeded 
megalomania, self-deception, self-absorption, fantasism, fanaticism, 
spiritual fascism, and psychological manipulation and abuse. It has also 
been one of the principal sources of most of the permanent cultural 
achievements of our civilisation.
At the heart of Th eism, transcendence combines with immanence in 
the intoxicating thought that the infi nite is also the intimate: God himself 
has a plan even for my life. Constantine had this belief—Veyne p.51 
quotes him telling the Council of Nicaea his reasons for thinking that he 
is “particularly distinguished by a special decision of Providence.” (And 
the mystical marriage of the soul to Christ, John Donne says in a famous Sonnet that 
he will be “nor ever chaste, except thou ravish me,” Simone Weil remarks, apparently 
quite casually, that “le mystique tourne violemment vers Dieu la faculté d’amour et de 
désir dont l’énergie sexuelle constitue le fondement physique” (SW, cited on p.41, tome 
VI, vol.2), and then in the Bible there is Psalm 45, and the forsaken bride of Hosea and 
deutero-Isaiah, and more than one Gospel parable, and “the wedding feast of the lamb” 
in Revelation—and the Song of Songs. (Rabbi Akiba: “Th e whole world is worth less than 
the day on which the Song of Songs was given to Israel . . . all the scriptures are holy, but 
the Song of Songs is the Holy of Holies”.)
9 Compare also the Kantian thesis that the Enlightenment deity Universal Reason 
can fi nd a lodging place even within me: see my “Intuition, system and the ‘paradox’ 
of deontology,” pp.271-288 in Julian Wuerth and Lawrence Jost, ed., Perfecting Virtue 
(Cambridge: CUP 2011), at p. 283. 
10 Th e word is pre-Christian Greek. It is not only Th eists who have believed that gods 
can enter the human breast: see e.g. Euripides’ Bacchae. Or that divine action on humans 
can be quasi- or actually erotic: see Ovid’s Metamorphoses.
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who can say that Constantine did not have good reason to think so?) 
William Gladstone had this belief: see the citations from his diaries in 
Roy Jenkins’ biography. Jesus and St Paul and Augustine and Mohammed 
and Aquinas and St Francis and Martin Luther and John Calvin and John 
Knox and Ignatius Loyola and Blaise Pascal and Isaac Newton and René 
Descartes and John Wesley and David Livingstone and Gerard Manley 
Hopkins had this belief. I believe it myself. Every believer who has ever 
taken himself to receive divine guidance, as millions constantly do, has 
had this belief. Once the belief becomes credible, its attraction is almost 
irresistible.
Th is brilliant and seductive psychological appeal both to our sense 
of smallness and to our sense of greatness is the reason, Veyne argues, 
why Christianity won out in its battle with the feeble, syncretistic, and 
disaggregated supernaturalism of paganism; the contrast revealed 
Christianity as quite simply a better-designed religion. To use Veyne’s 
word, a masterpiece:11 
Certain agnostic historians may think it less than scholarly to draw up 
a comparison between the merits of diff erent religions. But . . . to do so is 
not to violate the principle of axiological neutrality any more than one does 
when one recognises the superiority of certain artistic or literary creations, 
a superiority to which Constantine’s contemporaries were no more blind 
than we ourselves are. Why ever should the creative imagination of religions 
not produce masterpieces, likewise? (Veyne p.18)
II.
If our concern is not (like some busy contemporaries) to denounce 
Th eism but to understand it, it is the perspective aff orded by this notion 
of the Infi nite Intimate that we need to start from.
Most philosophers routinely don’t start from any such perspective, or 
even ever reach it. Th ey start from a dictionary defi nition like the SOED’s. 
Th ey take the heart of Th eism to be, not a history of vivid and direct 
experience of an infi nite God who has a plan even for fi nite you, but the 
11 I write as a Christian—quoting Veyne, who writes as an atheist and sometime 
communist.
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proposition that “Th ere is some god or gods.” Th ey marshal arguments for 
and against this proposition. And so we get the familiar does-God-exist 
debates of contemporary philosophy, in which God so incongruously 
shows up as a possibly-missing component in the mechanics of cosmology 
or evolution, part of a botched attempt at scientifi c explanation. Or 
philosophers note the troubling tension between the Th eist’s doctrine of 
the goodness of the creator and the datum of the badness of large tracts 
of the creation, recast doctrine and datum alike as propositions, and look 
for a tertium datur to resolve the clash: and so we get the problem-of-evil 
literature. Or philosophers take the nub of the Th eistic doctrines of God’s 
omnipotence or omniscience, or the specifi cally Christian doctrine of 
the Trinity, to be, likewise, a matter of propositions; and here again they 
draw our attention to the logical diffi  culties attending those doctrines, 
considered as concatenations of propositions.
Th e problem with this abstractly propositional approach is not that 
it is wrong. Th e problem is that, pursued in isolation, it tends to miss the 
foundational role of experience in Th eism. 
To be a Christian is to know, however deep down, and however much we 
forget from day to day, that our relationship with Christ is everything. 
Perhaps too many Christians bang on too loudly about their ‘personal 
relationship with Jesus,’ so that it sounds fake and superfi cial. But equally, 
perhaps, too many Christians keep quiet about it. Because it is true that 
this is the heart of it—everything else is no more than commentary. And 
to work on that relationship—to give it ‘quality time,’ to pay attention, to 
listen, to try to please the Beloved—is no less important than in a human 
marriage. (Jeff rey John, Th e Meaning in the Miracles (Norwich: Canterbury 
Press 2001), p.54)
Consider two aspects of experience, one having to do with the epistemic 
position, the other with the diachronic nature, of the Th eist’s beliefs. First, 
the epistemic position.
Consider someone who, like us all I assume, lives her life in the 
midstream of a constant deluge of the best evidence she could possibly 
have that external-world scepticism is false: experiential evidence. An 
abstractly propositional approach to external-world scepticism is bound 
to look slightly strange to any such person. Certainly someone in this 
epistemic position can understand sceptical doubts, explore them with 
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interest and engagement, note with surprise—or perturbation—the 
diffi  culty of conclusively rebutting any argument of, e.g., this form:
 1. If I do not know that no evil demon is deceiving me, then I do not 
know that I have hands.
 2.  I do not know that no evil demon is deceiving me. 
 3. So I do not know that I have hands.
Can she take such sceptical doubts seriously? Is it possible to her that 
external-world scepticism might be true? It is hard to see how it could be, 
for the reason identifi ed by G. E. Moore12: because her justifi cation for 
denying the conclusion of the sceptical argument (3) is so much better 
than any justifi cation she could possibly have for accepting its premises 
(1, 2). She is certain she has hands. If her alternatives are to deny that 
she is certain, or to deny one of the sceptical argument’s premises, then 
she has every reason to pick the second alternative. She may not know 
which premise is false, but her certainty about the falsehood of (3) means 
that she is completely rational, and completely justifi ed, in asserting 
“Not ((1) and (2)).” Sceptical arguments like (1-3) may set her intriguing 
intellectual puzzles; they may even provide her with a livelihood writing 
about them. What they will not do is threaten her basic confi dence that, 
for instance, she does indeed know she has hands.
Th ey might threaten her assurance of that if it was a whole lot weaker, 
or if her epistemic position were strictly neutral—if she was antecedently 
disposed simply to consider each proposition on its logical merits in 
the abstract, and not disposed to take any proposition whatever to be 
any more or less sure than any other. But her position is precisely not 
neutral in this way. And the case of the Th eist is parallel. As I put it 
above, the person considering external-world scepticism “lives her life 
in the midstream of a constant deluge of experiential evidence” for the 
existence of an external world. Th at sets her so far from abstract epistemic 
neutrality that she has every justifi cation for weighting external-world 
scepticism as no more than an intriguing intellectual puzzle. Similarly, 
the defi ning feature of Th eism is the Th eist’s experience of an infi nite 
but intimate God; and this sets the Th eist so far from abstract epistemic 
12 In “Our knowledge of the external world”, Proceedings of the British Academy 1939.
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neutrality that she too has every justifi cation for weighting most of the 
standard budget of problems for Th eism found in typical philosophy of 
religion basically as interesting puzzles. Th e epistemic reasoner is certain 
that the world is real, on the basis of her experience; so her question 
about the sceptical argument is not “I wonder whether it is sound?” 
but “I wonder where exactly it goes wrong?.” Th e Th eist is certain13 that 
God is real, on the basis of her experience; so her question about anti-
Th eistic arguments is not whether they prove that there is no God, but 
how exactly they fail to prove that.
Contemporary opponents of Th eism tend to assume that everyone 
who is rational starts in the same epistemically neutral place, and 
assesses the arguments for Th eism, in the timeless abstract, from that 
epistemically neutral place. We might ask whether this epistemic 
neutrality even exists, and what use it would be to us if it did. Th at 
aside, when someone is rationally assessing an argument, the fact that 
her background beliefs include strong reasons for thinking that the 
argument’s conclusion cannot be true is no objection to her rationality. 
Th e best arguments for external-world scepticism may be good arguments 
indeed. Th at does not mean that they should convince anyone. Normal 
people have overwhelmingly good evidence in their own experience that 
there is an external world, and reasonably take this to “epistemically 
outweigh” even the best arguments going for external-world scepticism. 
Likewise, the best arguments against Th eism may be formidable, yet 
completely unpersuasive to a Th eist—even a rational and fair-minded 
Th eist. Th e whole point about Th eism is that it claims that individuals 
can have overwhelmingly good experiential evidence that there is a God. 
To allow this experience to “epistemically outweigh” even the best anti-
Th eist arguments is no less reasonable than the analogous move against 
external-world scepticism.
Th is notion of epistemic position helps us to understand the spirit in 
which Th eists from strongly Th eist societies like Anselm and Aquinas 
off er arguments for God’s existence. Th ey do so in something like the 
13 I do not mean to underplay the reality of doubt in religious experience, which 
happens to all believers some of the time, and some believers all of the time. Yet the fact 
that doubt happens does not undermine the basic fact I am insisting on here: that an 
experiential certainty of the reality of God (perhaps a fl uctuating one) is characteristic of 
Th eism. (Th anks to Jeff rey John for discussion.)
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same spirit as contemporary epistemologists who do not really doubt the 
external world’s existence for a moment off er anti-sceptical arguments 
for the existence of an external world. In both cases the arguments that 
p are not evoked by a live doubt whether p, but rather by an interest in 
exploring alternative possible structures of argument that might or might 
not support the undoubted truth that p. Perhaps we might even say that 
arguments about God’s existence are to the pre-Cartesian philosophical 
world as arguments about the external world’s existence are to the post-
Cartesian.
Th e notion of epistemic position also illuminates some familiar 
impasses in present-day debates about the philosophy of religion. For 
instance, critics of Th eism sometimes struggle even to see their Th eist 
interlocutors as rational, as dealing in the currency of arguments. 
It is sometimes cynically said that the conclusion is “the point in the 
argument where you stop thinking.” Cynicism aside, diff erent reasonable 
people can have diff erent good reasons for being content to reach their 
rational resting-places at diff erent lemmas. One respectable source of 
these diff erent good reasons is diff erent backgrounds of experience. So 
the atheist who fi nds some purely logical problem in the notion of God’s 
omnipotence, e.g. that a God who “could do anything” neither could 
nor could not create a stone too heavy for Himself to lift , may conclude 
straight away that there cannot be a God. Whereas a Th eist, confronted 
with the same problem, may respond “Oh, how interesting. So God’s 
omnipotence must be beyond our understanding”; or “Ah, OK, so there is 
one thing that God can’t do—but He is otherwise omnipotent,” or “Well, 
this thing has a logically inconsistent description, so of course God can’t 
do it”;14 or “Oh, so perhaps omnipotence is not what matters in thinking 
about God”15—or in some other way may qualify her understanding 
of what God is like, without in any way weakening her confi dence that 
God is. Th is tenacity about God’s existence may (to repeat) be perfectly 
rational; as if it is based upon overwhelmingly good experiential evidence 
14 For what it’s worth this is my own response (there are plenty of others) to this old 
chestnut. Th e task that it sets for God has this description: to create a stone that cannot be 
lift ed by an agent who can do anything. Th e inconsistency in this description is obvious. 
15 So Peter Geach, who prefers to talk about “almightiness,” in his “Omnipotence” 
[1973], pp.63-75 in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, Oxford University Press, 
1998.
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of God’s existence. Th at evidence does not come into the argument about 
the coherence of the doctrine of omnipotence. But it does, so to speak, 
“wait outside” the argument, to evaluate its conclusion. And someone 
who lacks this evidence will reasonably form a diff erent evaluation of 
that conclusion from someone who has it.
I said that Th eists can have “every justifi cation for weighting most of 
the standard budget of problems for Th eism found in typical philosophy 
of religion basically as interesting puzzles.” Most, I said, because one 
standard problem in philosophy of religion is bound to be grievously 
more than a mere intellectual puzzle. Th is is the classic problem of evil. 
God, says Epicurus, either wishes to prevent evils, and is unable; or he is 
able, and is unwilling; or he is neither willing nor able; or he is both willing 
and able. If he is willing and is unable, he is weak, which does not fi t the 
character of God. If he is able and unwilling, he is malevolent, which does 
not fi t God’s character either. If he is neither willing nor able, he is both 
malevolent and weak, and therefore not God at all. If he is both willing and 
able which alone is fi tting for God, from what source then are evils? Why 
does he not prevent them? (Lactantius, de Ira Dei (c.313 AD); the fi rst extant 
formulation of Epicurus’ version of the problem of evil)
Evidently Epicurus’ puzzle was presented as a puzzle for believers in 
a God of good providence: the Stoics’ God, or Lactantius’ own Christian 
God. (Epicurus seems not to have presented it, as people oft en present 
it today, as a puzzle for believers in God. Epicurus himself apparently 
believed in God, just not a providential or caring one.)
Epicurus’ puzzle is an intellectual puzzle, but it is not merely an 
intellectual puzzle. To any feeling person, the existence of evil in our 
world must create an emotional struggle as well as an intellectual puzzle. 
Th eists suppose that there is a God who is good enough to want the very 
best for his creatures, and powerful enough to do anything He chooses. 
So why in Heaven’s name doesn’t He choose to do the very best?
One striking thing about this question is how much time Th eists 
themselves spend asking it, while being altogether unable to answer it.16 
16 Indeed, Th eists are oft en not at their best—to put it mildly—when they think they 
do have “the” answer to the problem of evil; as Voltaire famously pointed out in Candide, 
with specifi c reference to Leibniz.
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Why standest thou afar off , O Lord? Why hidest thou thyself in time of tro-
uble? (Psalm 10.1)
What is man, that thou shouldest magnify him, and that thou shouldest set 
thine heart upon him, and that thou shouldest visit him every morning—
and try him every moment? (Job 6.17-18)
Th ou art indeed just, Lord, if I contend
With thee; but, sir, so what I plead is just.
Why do sinners’ ways prosper? And why must
Disappointment all I endeavour end?
Wert thou my enemy, O thou my friend,
How wouldst thou worst, I wonder, than thou dost
Defeat, thwart me? Oh, the sots and thralls of lust 
Do in spare hours more thrive than I that spend,
Sir, life upon thy cause… 
(Gerard Manley Hopkins; cp. Jeremiah 12.1)
My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? (Psalm 22.1/ Mt 27.46)
If the answer is infi nite light
Why do we sleep in the dark? (Paul Simon17)
Or, if I may be forgiven for quoting a poem of my own, “Th e Children’s 
Cemetery, Balgay”:
Parents’ sentences on marble;
mildewed dolls beneath grown trees:
O you who mark the sparrow’s fall,
did you not notice these?
You could call the whole Judaeo-Christian Th eistic tradition a tradition 
of complaining at God. Stephen Fry, himself partly Jewish, somewhere18 
has a fi ctional character (also Jewish) describe the Jews as “his stupid, 
moaning, helpless and cosmically irritating people.” Perhaps that is how 
most Th eists seem to God Himself.
17 Paul Simon, “How can you live in the northeast?” on his 2006 album Surprise 
(Warner).
18 Stephen Fry, Th e Hippopotamus (London: Hutchinson, 1995), p.218.
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Th is Th eistic moaning tells us something important about Th eism 
and the problem of evil. Th e critic of Th eism quite oft en notices that 
she makes little or no impression on Th eists by simply announcing a list 
of worldly mishaps, be they never so dire. Th e critic may conclude that 
Th eists just display a mulish imperviousness to empirical evidence. For 
the Th eist, however, this sort of evidence is irrelevant. Pace John Stuart 
Mill,19 Th eists do not arrive at their Th eism by doing a “value-audit” on 
creation: totting up the net balance of good and evil in creation, inferring 
that the net balance of good and evil in any Creator would have to be 
just the same, and concluding either that there is a universally good 
Creator and the discordant partial evil in the world is only “harmony 
not understood,” or that there is no such Creator, or that the Creator 
is either morally ambiguous or just plain evil. Th eir Th eism was, so to 
speak, already there before they even considered how things stand with 
the world. And it rests upon quite a diff erent ground from any calculus 
of good and bad fortune in the world that might be devised; the ground 
of experience.
Hence Th eists see the problem of evil too from a quite diff erent 
epistemic position from their critics. It is not that Th eists—unless they 
are intolerably naïve, smug, and callous—do not see evil as a problem. But 
it is that Th eists see evil as a problem in time: a diachronic problem.20
Suppose you have a friend whom you trust deeply, on the solid 
evidential basis of your long and vivid experience of that friend’s care for 
you. One day you fi nd very strong evidence that that friend has betrayed 
you in some fundamental way. Is there only one rational response to 
this new negative evidence: to weigh the new negative against your past 
positive evidence and decide which counts for more?
You might think so if you were considering the question in abstraction 
from time, as a straight inconsistency in the propositions that constitute 
19 J. S. Mill, “Essay on nature,” at http://www.lancs.ac.uk/users/philosophy/texts/mill_
on.htm: “If a tenth part of the pains which have been expended in fi nding benevolent 
adaptations in all nature had been employed in collecting evidence to blacken the 
character of the Creator, what scope for comment would not have been found . . .” Th anks 
for the reference to Peter Cave.
20 I think it is a narrative problem too. I do not have space to pursue this here, but see 
Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness (OUP 2010), especially her distinction between 
“Dominican” and “Franciscan” philosophical reasoning at the beginning.
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your evidence. But suppose you look at your evidential problem about 
your friend, as of course you in fact will, as a diachronic problem, 
a problem in time. Th en you will immediately see that you have two 
further salient options besides insisting on reaching a verdict, right now, 
on nothing but the present balance of evidence. One option is to wait and 
see how things turn out. If you just hold off  a little, then maybe a good 
explanation of your friend’s apparent betrayal will soon become clear to 
you. Th e other option is to confront your friend. Track him down, explain 
how things look to you, see what he has to say for himself. In short, have 
a good moan at him, and see how he takes it.
Both these responses to a trusted friend’s apparent betrayal seem 
just as rational as insisting on reaching an immediate verdict about that 
apparent betrayal without waiting or looking for more evidence. Indeed 
in imaginable particular cases, they will oft en be far more rational. Th eir 
rationality depends, broadly speaking, on how good are your antecedent 
reasons for trusting the friend.
Just likewise with the Th eist’s response to the problem of evil. Hers too 
is in no way an irrational response to the epistemic confl ict confronting 
her as a result of that problem. She does not fi nd herself atemporally 
confronted with the raw propositions “Th ere is a morally perfect and 
omnipotent creator God” and “Th ere is evil in the world,” and challenged 
to fi nd a way to reconcile them or weigh them off  against each other in 
the abstract. Rather, the problem of evil typically comes to the Th eist 
within the time-series of her experience and her life. First there is her 
experience of God; then there is the fact that she is confronted by some 
particular evil, perhaps by horrifying evil. But the time-series does not 
stop there. It goes on, and that gives the Th eist her chance to wait and 
see what God might do about the evil that confronts her—and indeed to 
moan at God about it.
Th is is precisely what Th eists have always done, confronted with some 
evil.21 Th is is what the Psalmist means by “my soul waits upon the Lord,” 
an attitude that he clearly thinks is not just possible, but imperative, even 
in the most exigent circumstances, and even when God appears to do 
nothing about the evil facing her.
21 Oft en they can also do something about the evil themselves, and so provide the 
answer to their own prayers. Nothing I say here is meant to rule out or occlude that 
possibility. 
137THEISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Behold, as the eyes of servants look unto the hand of their masters, and as 
the eyes of a maiden unto the hand of her mistress: so our eyes wait upon the 
Lord our God, until that he have mercy upon us. (Psalm 123.2-4)
I say “confronted with some evil.” Th ere is a distinction between specifi c 
evils that confront Th eists in specifi c cases, and evil in general—the sum 
total of evil in the whole world—that confronts the Th eist all the time. 
But the problem of evil is about evil, and both specifi c evils and evil in 
general are varieties of that. Evil in general is a much bigger and less 
tractable problem than specifi c evils, but the theist’s attitude to both 
general and specifi c evil is essentially the same. It is that you have to see 
it as something that happens at some point in time; and that you have to 
either wait patiently, or bother God impatiently, about it until God has 
provided a resolution. 
What we must completely get away from is the idea that the world as it now 
exists is a rational whole. We must think of its unity not by the analogy of 
a picture, of which all the parts exist at once, but by the analogy of a drama 
where, if it is good enough, the full meaning of the fi rst scene only becomes 
apparent with the fi nal curtain; and we are in the middle of this. Consequently 
the world as we see it is strictly unintelligible. We can only have faith that it 
will become intelligible when the divine purpose, which is the explanation 
of it, is accomplished. (Archbishop William Temple, quoted in Iremonger, 
1948, pp. 537–8)
Central to the Th eist’s outlook is an attitude of hope.22 Such hope might 
be misplaced or over-optimistic, of course. But is a hopeful attitude to 
the world so very obviously less rational than thinking of the world as 
so botched, maimed, and incompetent that any “God” who had made 
it would deserve only our hatred and contempt? Even if it were less 
rational, mightn’t it still suggest a better, because more humane, way to 
learn to live?
[What a humane education is most deeply concerned with] is the possibility of 
coming into an inheritance. It has to do with no less a question than whether 
22 On hope cp. my “Why is faith a virtue?,” Religious Studies 32 (1996), pp.27-36; 
reprinted (2002) in Charles Taliaferro and Philip Quinn, ed., Th e Blackwell Companion 
to the Philosophy of Religion.
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a man can be at home in the world—whether he can fi nd it a good world 
despite the ill. Not that I am supposing that there is a kind of education that 
could guarantee the outcome, but rather this: by being brought into contact 
with forms of understanding . . . in which some good is to be encountered, 
some wonder to be seen, whether in nature or the work of human beings, 
a person might be helped to see the beauty of reality, helped to live more 
fully, helped to be glad that he is alive. (Roy Holland, Against Empiricism 
(Oxford: Blackwell 1980), p.59)
Th e last thing to say about the diachronic conception of the problem of 
evil is to add that in quite a number of cases of specifi c evils that they 
have experienced, Th eists in practice are very likely to say that God has 
provided a resolution. Th ey found themselves in some crisis or other; 
and they either waited to see what God would do, or bothered God about 
the crisis, or both; and God did do something about it. Th at is what 
Cromwell’s followers, John Milton for example, said about the founding 
of the English “Commonwealth” in 1649; it is what most English people 
thought about the defeat of the Armada in 1588, and what a substantial 
proportion of the English thought about Bonaparte’s failure to invade in 
1798 and Hitler’s failure to invade in 1940; it is what many believers on 
the run from a whole variety of psychotic regimes have said about their 
experience of (as they saw it) being protected from capture and death; it 
is what millions of obscure believers have taken to happen in their own 
experience at all sorts of life-junctures—fi nding a spouse, for example; 
most saliently of all to a Christian, it is what Jesus’ disciples said about 
the resurrection.
Th e point here is not whether such claims made by Th eists are 
contestable or not (of course they are contestable). Th e point is only that 
they are entirely characteristic of Th eism. In this respect as in so many 
others, real Th eism could not be less like the caricature Th eisms that 
so oft en dominate philosophical debate—for instance, Antony Flew’s 
undetectable gardener.23 Pace Flew, Th eists typically take their God to 
be a highly detectable gardener. Indeed they think they’ve detected him. 
Or he them.24
23 Antony Flew, „Th eology and Falsifi cation,” University, 1950-51.
24 Th anks for their comments to Chris Belshaw, Nick Everitt, Jeff rey John, Eleonore 
Stump, and an audience at the University of Northampton.
